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RECENT CASES
EQUITY-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF ORAL
CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF LAND.
(Mezza v. Beiletti 161 Pa. Super. Court 213 (1947))
This case involved an action for specific performance of a parol
contract for the sale of real estate. The existence of the parol
contract was admitted by the pleadings of the defendant. Possession of the property by the plaintiff was also admitted. The case
turned on the issue of the payment of the purchase money. The
failure of the plaintiff to prove adequately that the entire consideration was paid in full, caused the court to reverse the decree for
specific performance and remand the case to the lower court for
further testimony to clarify that issue. The defendant placed the
question of improvements in issue, but the lower court determined
this in favor of the plaintiff. The Superior Court in commenting
on this phase of the acti6n stated, "It has long been held that a
vendee who has paid the purchase price and is in possession is entitled to specific performance of a parol contract even though he
has made no improvements."
The question immediately raised is how long has this been
held. True, there is authority for this proposition, but it is far from
uncontrovertible. The court cited lamison v. Dunok (95 Pa. 52
(1880)) to sustain this rule. In the Jamison case, Justice Sterrett
said that there was no error in refusing to hold that a parol contract
of sale cannot be specifically enforced unless the vendee can show
that he has made improvements for which he cannot be compensat-

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

ed in damages. There are undoubtly cases in accord; viz. Tresrler's
Estate, 66 Pa. Super. Court 547, (1917); Tetlow's Estate, 321 Pa.
305 (1936) 184 A. 129.
However there is much Pennsylvania authority to the contrary..
In Fay's Estate, 213 Pa. 428 (1906), 62 A. 991, the Supreme Court
held that if the loss which arises out of a breach of a parol contract
can be compensated in damages the case ordinarily is not taken out
of the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries. The Superior Court in Johnson and Johnson v. Schrowder, 80 Pa. Super. Court 120 (1922) indicated that improvements uncompensatable at law are necessary before the court will decree specific performance of a parol contract
for the sale of land. In Weller v. Potts, 230 Pa. 6 (1911) 79 A.
782 the Supreme Court again held that in order to take a parol contract for the sale of land out of the operation of the Statute of
Frauds, it is essential that possession should be taken in pursuance
of the contract or immediately after it was made, that the change in
possession should be continuous, exclusive and maintained and that
there should have been such performance of the contract by the
vendee as would make rescission inequitable.
The Supreme Court in Sample v. Herlocker, 177 Pa. 247
(1897) 35 A. 615, said that to take a parol contract for the sale of
lands out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds, performance or
part performance must be shown by the vendee which could not be
compensated in damages and such would make rescission inequitable and unjust.
The above cases are but a few of a long line which hold that
in addition to possession there must be improvements or a change
of position such as cannot be readily compensated in damages. (See
Pa. Annotations to Restatement ofContracts, Section 179.) It apears, therefore, that the better statement would have been that it
as sometimes been held that improvements are unnecessary in
order to take a case out of the Statute of Frauds.
The question now arises as to when improvements will be
necessary and when unnecessary in order to remove these cases from
the Statlte of Frauds. It can be said with certainty that where there
is a parol agreement to give land, there must be improvements or
a change of position by the 'vendee which cannot, be adequately
compensated in damages; viz. Morrish v. Price, 293 Pa. 169
(1928); Byrne's Estate, 122 Pa. Supr. Court 410 (1936) 142 A.
137; Koyscia v. Lessig, 122 Pa. Supr. Court 413 (1936) 186 A.
187. But where there is a parol contract for the sale of land, it appears that the court will weigh the equities and render the decree in
favor of the party having the greater equity. In Byrne's Estate, supra,
the court stated that specific performance is not a matter of right but
of grace. An examination of the cases seems to buttress this doctrine.
This case has added little to the clarification of the required elements
for the specific performance of a parol contract for the sale of real
estate in Pennsylvania.
R. W. Hopkins.
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS: DIVORCE-CONSTRUCTIVE DESERTION
In the recent case of Heimovitz v. Heimovitz, 161 Pa. Super. 522 (1947),
55 A. 2nd.-, the problem of "constructive desertion" again came before the
appellate courts of Pennsylvania. In this case the libellant-husband alleged desertion and indignities to the person as grounds for divorce. The respondent-wife
had exercised a "belligerent attitude" towards the libellant for several months
prior to the separation. Finally, in September 1940, she chased the libellant down
the stairs of the apartment house in which they were living, threw a burlap bag
containing his clothes after him and said, "Take your clothes and get out; I don't
want you any more." Respondent remained in the home, and after five years of
separation libellant brought this suit for divorce alleging desertion and indignities.
The court disposed of the case as follows:
"It will not be necessary to determine whether libellant has
made out a case of indignities, since from an independent consideration of the testimony we find ourselves in agreement with both
the master and the lower court that desertion was established by
clear and satisfactory evidence sufficient in law. Desertion does not
consist exclusively in a wilful and malicious abandonment of the
common home. Desertion results also where one is excluded from
the home by the other spouse, wilfully and without justification.
Such exclusion is not "constructive" desertion merely (though
loosely so-called in isolated cases e.g., Sowers Appeal, 89 Pa. 173)
it is actual desertion and grounds for divorce df such." (Italics sup-

plied)
Without so mentioning, the court is by this decision making a startling
change in the Pennsylvania law. In an early case, Howe v. Howe, 16 Pa. Super
193 (1901) the doctrine of constructive desertion was announced as follows:
"If the husband by cruel and barbarous treatment renders it
impossible for her to continue to live with him with safety, her act
in leaving is not desertion by her. The desertion in such case is
upon his part. He as completely commits desertion when by his
conduct he compels her for her safety to leave him as when he wilfully and without cause abandons her."
This doctrine, however, was repudiated by the later case of Young v. Young,
82 Pa. Super. 492 (1924). In that case the libellant-husband left his wife because
of alleged indignities to the person. He sued for desertion, as the court said, ". .on
grounds of what is called constructive desertion." The court refused to grant
the divorce and held:
"We cannot regard evidence of cruelty or indignities practiced
by the wife as sufficient to establish a desertion of her husband by
her. The law provides a specific remedy for a husband injured by
cruelty of his wife, or by hef conduct amounting to indignities to
his person, and to this the injured party must appeal if he would
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have relief. As long as the wife remains at the habitation and keeps
the domestic flag flying, she is not subject to charge of desertion
whatever other adequate provocation she may have given to sustain
the libel."
Ever since this decision it has been the law of Pennsylvania that constructive
desertion was NOT grounds for divorce, but that the injured spouse had to sue
on the grounds which caused the separation.
Krebs v. Krebs, 109 Pa. Super. 175 (1933) was distinguished from the
Young case, in that if the husband ordershis wife out of the house and she leaves,
the subsequent act of the husband in removing the furniture and abandoning the
home so that she has no place to return, constitutes desertion on his part.
The court in the Heimovitz case relies largely on the case of Reiter v. Reiter,
159 Pa. Super. 344 (1946) to support its position. In that case, by way of dicta,
the court laid down three conclusions on the constructive desertion question:
"1. Where a husband purposely locks out, or bars, his wife
from the common habitation, her habitation is no longer his home,
but is the street or place to which she goes, and the husband has
deserted her and absented himself from her habitation which he
forced her to obtain by destroying for her the common abode. If
wilful and malicious, and without reasonable cause, and persisted
in for two years, it is a desertion in the words of the statute.
"2. So, too, where a husband physically ejects his wife from
the common home.
"3. So, also, where a husband threatens immediately to inflict
bodily harm on his wife unless she leaves, and she departs against
her will, and because of justifiable harm of physical injury."
The court in the Reiter case then went on to say:
"In the type of desertion now discussed the libellant must be
wilfully and maliciously put out by force or justifiable fear of
immediate bodily harm, or locked out against the will and without
consent of the innocent spouse."
In the actual decision of the case, the decree of the lower court granting the
divorce on grounds of constructive desertion was reversed, because the lower
court in the charge to the jury said it was constructive desertion if the libellant
was "compelled" to leave. This, said the court, was not strong enough. However,
is there more than mere "compelling" to leave in the Heimovitz case?
The analysis of these cases leaves the question of constructive desertion in
somewhat an uncertain state. The Young case has not been expressly overruled.
The Reiter case cited it without comment, but it was not even mentioned in the
Heimovitz case. Dicta in the Reiter case indicates that constructive desertion is
grounds for divorce if "the libellant be wilfully and maliciously put out by force
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or fear uf inimediate bodily harm, or locked out against the will." Mere compelling to leave is NOT enough. The Heirnovitz case, the latest authority on
point, expressly holds that constructive desertion is ACTUAL desertion, hence
grounds for divorce, even though the libellant is evicted from the common home
NOT by force or fear of immediate bodily harm. In fact, it is not even necessary
for the libellant to make out a case of indignities.
The conclusion reached from the holding of the Heimovitz case, is that
today in Pennsylvania whenever one spouse is excluded from the common home
by the other spouse, wilfully and without justification, persisted in for two years,
such exclusion is actual desertion by the spouse so excluding and as such is
grounds for divorce,
John R. Miller, Jr.

